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Abstract: This paper investigates the role of basic pensions in alleviating poverty in sub-
Saharan Africa. Using the most recent Senegalese household income-expenditure data survey, 
we construct scenarios of universal and means-tested basic pension schemes with different 
generosity levels. Simulations indicate that basic pension benefits have sizeable impact on 
poverty reduction amongst households, with elderly members, which translates into large 
decreases in aggregate poverty measures. The paper also analyzes the fiscal costs of basic 
pensions and shows that these are fiscally affordable as long as pension levels are reasonable. 
This suggests that basic pension programs could be financially sustainable in sub-Saharan 
African. 
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It is now widely recognized that in developing countries pensions play an important role in 
securing and improving the livelihoods of older people and reducing poverty. Evidence indicates 
that poverty among older people is generally low in countries where there exists a generous 
pension or safety net coverage for the elderly like in Brazil, Chile or South Africa. In contrast, in 
countries where old-age pension systems are inexistent or target a few number of people, older 
people are over-represented among the poor (Barrientos, 2003; Barrientos, Gorman, and Heslop, 
2003; Bourguignon et al., 2004; Deaton and Paxson, 1997). Moreover, evidence suggests that in 
developing countries the positive effects of pensions go beyond the direct beneficiaries (the 
older people) and spill over on the other members of their households. Case studies in Brazil and 
South Africa indicate that children within beneficiary households have higher school enrolment 
rates and better health status than those living in households that do not receive pension (Duflo, 
2003).  
 
However, despite such a positive role, the majority of African populations remain uncovered by 
a pension scheme. Except few countries (South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius, and Botswana), 
almost none of African countries have put emphasis on broadening its pension system coverage 
or implementing a safety net program supporting the elderly. This was in line with the World 
Bank’s recommendations in its report on the old-age crisis (World Bank, 1994). The World 
Bank’s argument was that traditional support systems for older people in African societies are 
working relatively well and that formal pension systems would crowd out private transfers and 
make things worse. As a consequence of that, the issue of pension provision is seldom 
considered in development programs and poverty reduction strategies in Africa. It seems 
therefore that the provision of pension scheme has not been a priority. 
 
Such a low priority put on pension and on the livelihood of older people in Africa is grounded on 
a series of arguments which in reality are fallacious. One of these arguments is that family living 
arrangements in Africa give older people an appropriate framework of support and care 
provision. By living within extended families, older people benefit from the support and care of 
their coresidents, due to the resilience of the cultural and social norms of respect and reverence 
for elders in African societies. Then, there is no need for developing state-organized policy for 
old-age support. This view is rather naive. It is more based on an intuition than on a systematic 
investigation on how intergenerational relationship works within African families. The reasons 
are twofold. First, co-residence does not systematically imply old-age support. Evidence clearly 
indicates that relations between age-groups within African families work as intergenerational 
exchanges based on the economic contribution of the protagonists (Meillassoux, 1992). Older 
people’s ability to contribute is then essential for them to access household support (Barrientos, 
Gorman, and Heslop, 2003). Furthermore, social norms of respect and support for elders are 
likely to be less binding when younger generations are in poor economic conditions (Aboderin, 
2004). Second, family living arrangements in Africa are radically changing under the effects of 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, migration and urbanization. This phenomenon has prompted new 
forms of living arrangements like households without prime age adults. Households type of 
"elderly with children" or of "elderly only" are now widespread across the continent (Zimmer 
and Dayton, 2003). Thus, many traditional multigenerational households have become missing-
generations ones, with the responsibility for sustaining the household falling on older people 
(Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000).   2007/07 
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Another fallacy concerns the social payoff of a policy supporting the old. Due to resources 
constraints, policy makers in Africa usually argue that it is socially more profitable to focus on 
the needs of other age groups (children, mothers, and young workers) than to support the old 
people. This view broadly stems from the human capital theory. It is built on the idea that the 
returns on investment in the productive capacity of the young are likely to be higher than return 
on investment on the old. Indeed, such a view makes sense. However, investing in the young 
would be vain if the conditions that make this investment efficient are misperceived. Research 
has shown that poverty is intergenerational. That is, older people bequeath poverty to their 
dependents. Thus, old-age poverty is one of the prime causes for lack of childhood development 
and education and for poor nutrition and health (Barrientos, Gorman, and Heslop, 2003; 
Buchmann, 2000). Acquiring education and good health is then quite difficult for children living 
with poor old people. In consequence, the returns on investment on the children would likely be 
nil if decision makers fail to put a great emphasis on the conditions of the old. In contrast, 
investing in the elderly in Africa is likely to be socially profitable. Evidence from South Africa 
indicates that cash transfers to the elderly proved to be an effective tool of fighting poverty and 
redistribution, reaching simultaneously the elderly and their younger coresidents. A study by 
(Case and Deaton, 1998) has established that younger children in South Africa living with their 
grandparents derive large and direct benefits from the cash transfers received by the latter. This 
study has also found that these cash transfers disproportionately benefited the impoverished 
children since children with a low household per capita income are more likely to be living with 
an old person. The conclusion is that, due to the form of living arrangements in South Africa, 
social expenditures on the elderly and social expenditures on children are not alternatives. Even, 
cash transfers to the elderly turn out to be a good instrument to channel money to children living 
with them. Investigating further the behavioral effects induced by such program, Duflo (2003) 
found a positive correlation between these transfers and children’s nutritional status. More 
precisely, these estimates indicate that pensions received by women had a large impact on the 
anthropometric status (weight for height and height for age) of girls. These pensions have also 
been known to affect the behavior of prime-age adults who live with the elderly. Evidence 
indicates a negative effect on labor supply, particularly male labor supply (Bertrand, 
Mullainathan, and Miller, 2003) and a positive effect on migration decision - specifically of 
women - to places of employment, either to work or to look for a job (Posel, Fairburn, and Lund, 
2006).  
 
A study by (Subbarao and Kakwani, 2005) also clearly demonstrates that similar cash transfer 
programs in other African countries would have a significant impact on poverty among the 
elderly and their households. Their simulations show a very impressive reduction in old-age 
poverty if 0.5 % GDP were mobilized in a social pension program for single elderly, those living 
with children or elderly-headed households. And they note that in five out of 15 countries the 
reduction in national headcount poverty is greater if the program is targeted to households 
headed by the elderly than for those not headed by the elderly. See table 1 below. 2007/07 
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Table 1: Change (%) in Headcount ratio due to targeting 0.5 % GDP to the elderly 
Individuals Households   
Elderly person  Not led by elderly  Led by elderly 
Countries  Group Overall Group Overall Group Overall 
Burundi   −69.7  −0.4  −0.5  −0.4  −1.9  −0.2 
Burkina Faso   −100.0  −0.2  −2.1  −1.5  −3.6  −1.0 
Cote d’Ivoire   −100.0  −0.5  −2.5  −1.9  −22.1  −5.0 
Cameroon   −100.0  −0.3  −1.2  −1.0  −5.9  −1.3 
Ethiopia   −93.4  −0.5  −1.7  −1.4  −5.5  −1.0 
Ghana   −58.8  −0.5  −1.4  −1.1  −4.0  −0.8 
Guinea   −100.0  −0.4  −2.4  −1.7  −2.8  −0.8 
Gambia        −100.0  −0.1  −1.4  −1.0  −2.3  −0.7 
Kenya   −66.3  −0.8  −1.4  −1.2  −7.5  −1.4 
Madagascar   −100.0  −0.5  −1.3  −1.2  −8.5  −1.0 
Mozambique   −76.4  −0.5  −0.3  −0.3  −3.4  −0.5 
Malawi   −60.9  −0.5  −0.6  −0.5  −2.1  −0.3 
Nigeria   −91.3  −0.6  −0.6  −0.5  −6.9  −1.2 
Uganda   −92.8  −1.0  −1.5  −1.3  −5.5  −0.9 
Zambia   −99.8  −0.5  −0.6  −0.5  −2.7  −0.4 
Source : (Subbarao and Kakwani, 2005) 
 
This paper explores the feasibility of introducing in Sub-Saharan African countries a minimum 
income for old age independent of the worker’s history of earning, drawing evidence from the 
latest Senegalese household expenditure survey. In this country, like in most of African 
countries, the coverage rate of the social protection system is very small. It covers only 2 percent 
of the total population, corresponding to 9 percent of the active population. The rest of the 
population relies on family network support. Meanwhile, there are a growing number of people 
whose life expectancy is continuously rising
1 due to improvements in medical and nutritional 
conditions. The number of people who are more than 60 is growing fast (5 percent per year). 
And this occurs within a context of high fertility rate and huge progress in reducing infant 
mortality. The implication is a growing total number of people who potentially need family 
support. This is likely to put additional strains on families’ capacities to provide such support 
appropriately. Thus, within families, a trade-off becomes imperative between supporting the 
older members or supporting the younger. However, in this trade-off, no options would be 
desirable. If family support is skewed toward the elderly to the detriment of children, it induces 
adverse effects on children such as schooling postponement, precocious emergence in the labor 
market and a deprivation of their health status. In contrast, if support goes mainly to children, the 
older people then would likely be forced into destitution. To address these problems, it would 
therefore be logical to reorient public policy strategies putting a greater emphasis on income 
provision at later age.  
 
The approach used in this paper follows the one from (Bourguignon et al., 2004; Subbarao and 
Kakwani, 2005) and (Subbarao and Kakwani, 2005) by constructing reliable estimates of the 
fiscal cost of a basic pension and of its impacts on poverty. However, this study differs with 
these papers on one point. It does not look at the effects that a basic pension benefit induces on  
                                                 
1 It is noteworthy that, unlike most of African countries, Senegal is characterized by a low level of HIV 
seropositivity prevalence rate and a low level of AIDS-related mortality, suggesting that life expectancy is 
not adversely affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  2007/07 
  5
 
household’s decisions of labor supply, and income allocation to food, schooling, transfers, or 
saving as done by (Bourguignon et al., 2004). Our data do not allow identification of variation 
in household labor supply or expenditures.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides evidence on old-age poverty in Senegal. 
Section 3 gives taxonomy of basic pensions. Section 4 analyzes the implications of the different 
forms of basic pension in terms of poverty reduction and fiscal cost. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Old-age poverty in Senegal 
 
2.1.  Methodology and data 
Conventional methodology for inferring individual well being from household income or 
expenditure may be misleading when it is applied to an African setting. In fact, using household 
per capita income or expenditure as a welfare indicator introduces a downward bias in the 
estimation of old age poverty due to two major factors: the economies of scale and the relative 
cost of children. The issue on economies of scale is related to the fact that a larger household can 
achieve the same level of well being with lower per capita income or expenditure than a smaller 
household. Evidence on elderly living arrangements in developing countries suggests that, with 
few exceptions, the old groups live in smaller sized households than the young groups (Deaton 
and Paxson, 1997). Therefore, failure to adjust for the presence of economies of scale will 
systematically overestimate the well being of the old because they live in smaller households. 
The issue on children’s cost raises the fact that in developing countries, children are not as needy 
as adults. The cost of children differs significantly from the cost of adults. It is likely that the 
relative costs of children are lower in developing countries compared with developed countries. 
Thus, failure to adjust for differential costs of children and adults will also overestimate the well-
being of the elderly as they live, on average, in households with fewer children (Deaton and 
Paxson, 1997).  
 
To account for the economies of scale within household and the difference in household’s 
composition, many studies use the "adult equivalent per capita expenditure" as indicator of 
living standard. Assume that Y is the total household expenditure, A and K the number of adults 






e =  (4.1) 
where m, the adult equivalent household size, equals: 
  ( ) [ ]
θ βK A m + − + = 1 1  (4.2) 
The parameter β  corresponds to a measure of the cost of children relative to adults and θ  
reflects economies of scale within the household. The value of these parameters ranges between 
0 and 1. However, there is no consensus on their appropriate values for developing countries. 
Using the Engel curve method, Lachaud estimates the value of A for the Burkina Faso to 0.53 
and the relative cost of children for age group 0-4 years to 0.6 (Lachaud, 2000). Based on these  2007/07 
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values of the parameters Lachaud analyzes the relation between the equivalence scale and the 
spatial poverty in Burkina Faso. Two results are worth noting in his study. First, households 
having many children are not necessarily the poorest in Burkina Faso, except in the large cities. 
Second, the incidence of poverty strongly increases in households comprising only older persons 
when (β ,θ ) varies from (1, 1) to (0.60, 0.53). Deaton and Paxson explore the sensitivity of 
poverty counts to variations in assumptions about child cost and economies of size using data 
from a set of developing countries (Deaton and Paxson, 1995). They found that for a fixed 
poverty line, the poverty ranking for children and for the elderly depends on the values of the 
two parameters. For (β ,θ ) combinations of (1, 1), (1, 0.75), and (0.75, 1), children have higher 
fractions of poor than the elderly. In contrast, for combinations (0.5, 0.5), (0.75, 0.5), and (0.5, 
0.75), where there are either large economies of scale, or low child cost, or both, children are 
relatively favored, and the elderly have the higher fraction in poverty. Their conclusion is that 
when the economies of scale and/or the child cost change, the profile of poverty changes also. 
 
In our analysis, we pay attention to the possible impacts of differences in living arrangements 
and child cost on poverty profiles in Senegal. Thus, we first explore the sensitivity of relative 
poverty profiles to alternatives combinations of β  andθ . For that purpose, we proceed as 
follows. We start by measuring the poverty profiles of the different age groups and households 
assuming away any economy of scale and a child cost equivalent to one. Thereafter, we 
reconstruct these profiles using alternatives specifications of the values of β  andθ . Then, we 
look at whether changes in the combinations of β  andθ  overturn poverty ranking across age 
groups or household types. Recall that when θ  = 1, there are no economies of scale and lower 
values of A correspond to increasing economies of scale. When β  = 1, that signifies that 
children are as needy as adults; child cost is equivalent to the one of adults. We consider a 
person as old if she is 60 years or more and a child as one who is 14 years old or less. For 
poverty comparison between households, we focus on: households comprising three generations, 
elderly-headed households, and households with elderly, households with children and 
households without elderly. 
 
We consider various poverty measures which can be characterized in terms of the poverty line, 
the average income or consumption, and the Lorenz curve representing the structure of the 
relative income distribution. Thus, the poverty measure P is written as: 
 
  ( ) L z P P , ,µ =  (4.3)   
where z is the poverty line, µ is the mean income or consumption and L is the Lorenz curve. The 
most famous explicit functional forms for  ( ) L z P , ,µ  are the FGT class of additively 
decomposable poverty measures α P , with α  as a non-negative parameter of inequality aversion 
















 (4.4)   
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where  i y  is the income or consumption of the ith household or individual and n is the 
population size. When α  = 0,  0 P  corresponds to the headcount index H which measures the 




H =  (4.5)   
with q as the number of the poor and n the total population. For α  = 1,  1 P  refers to the poverty 
gap index in per person terms.  1 P  corresponds to the product of H and I, with I as the 
proportionate shortfall of the average income of the poor from the poverty line z. This measure 
represents the fraction of the poverty line z, which would have to be given per person of the 
whole population to eliminate poverty. When α  = 2,  2 P  corresponds to the severity of poverty. 
It is given by the mean of the squared proportionate income shortfall of individuals below the 
poverty line z.  2 P  is a poverty measure which reflects how poor the poor are. It is therefore very 
sensitive to the income distribution among the poor; the worse this distribution is, the more 
severe poverty is.  
 
The FGT measures have the propriety that they are additively separable. Thus, if we divide the 
total population into K mutually exclusive groups, the aggregate measure is the population 
weighted average of the measures for all subgroups of the population. 
 
  ∑ = =
k
k k K k P f P ,........ 1               ;     (4.6)   
where,  k f  and  k P  are the population share and poverty measure of the kth group.  
 
To assess the impact on poverty of alternative forms of basic pensions, we compute the three 
poverty measures with and without the income paid by the program. 
 
The data used come from the household surveys ESAM-I and ESAM-II.
2 These are nation-wide 
surveys implemented in 1995 and 2000 respectively. They targeted households selected from 
three strata: Dakar (the capital), other cities and rural areas. Data were collected on 3278 
households in ESAM I while ESAM II comprised 6608 households. The questionnaires cover 
information on individuals’ characteristics (age, education, sex, occupation, marital status, etc.) 
and indications on households’ structure (size, composition, etc.) and budget
3 (expenditures, 
income, assets, housing, etc.). The poverty line we use is that calculated by the Direction de la 
Prévision et de la Statistique - DPS of the Ministry of Finance of Senegal (table 2). 
 
                                                 
2 ESAM: Enquête Sénégalaise Auprès des Ménages 
3 Unlike ESAM I, ESAM II does not contain information on the sources of household incomes. 2007/07 
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Table 2: Poverty Lines (Per equivalent adult and per day in Franc CFA; 1 Euro1 = 655.957 Francs CFA) 
 
  Dakar  Other Cities  Rural 
ESAM I  743.2  662.5  384.7 
ESAM II  879.0  712.8  497.9 
Source:  Ministry of Finance, (DPS, 2004) 
 




Table 3 gives poverty measures for the different age groups across a range of combinations of 
β  andθ . As expected, we observe that large economies of scales dramatically reduce the 
incidence of poverty. Results indicate that, when we hold child cost fixed and allow even modest 
economies of scales, poverty incidence drops for all age groups substantially. Recall that the 
economies of scale are larger at the lower values of the parameter A. It is also noteworthy that 
when θ  decreases (holding β  fixed); poverty reduces almost in the same amplitude for all age 
groups. For example, when θ  decreases from 1 to 0.9 the poverty rate falls by 11.79 points of 
percentage for children and by 12.41 and 11.08 points for adults and elderly respectively. This 
suggests that poverty ranking across age groups in Senegal is likely to be neutral to changes in 
economies of scales. This is related to similarities in the forms of living arrangements. Evidence 
from table A1 indicate that people live in households with almost the same number of household 
members on average. Thus, the average size of household for a child is 13.18, and that is 12.57 
and 11.94 for an adult and an elderly person respectively. 
 
We also observe that changes in the economies of scales do not overturn the poverty ranking 
between the household types. Figures from table 4 indicate that, when economies of scales 
increase for a fixed child cost, poverty levels decrease sharply for all households types but that 
does not affect relative poverty rates between these different types of households. When θ  
decreases, the incidence of poverty also decreases but quite identically for all household types in 
a way that we can conclude that poverty comparisons between these households is not sensitive 
to the variations of the economies of scales. The reason is that the average number of household 
members is quite similar for all these households even if their demographic structures are not 
identical (table A2). 
 
Tables 3 and 4 also show the effects of changes in child costs on poverty incidences across age 
groups and households types. We observe that reductions in child cost (holding the parameter θ  
fixed) result in large poverty reductions for all age groups and households types. Figures in table 
3 indicate that, when child cost decreases from 1 to 0.75 (holding economies of scales fixed), the 
level of poverty decreases by 6.78 percentage points for children while poverty among adults 
and elderly decreases by 5.81 and 5.50 points respectively. And when child cost decreases 
further, from 0.75 to 0.5, poverty level drops by 10.38, 8 and 6.94 points for children, adults and 
elderly respectively. 
  2007/07 
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Table 3: Individual headcount ratio i.e. percentage of people who are poor 
distinguishing different age groups 
 
Combinations of (β  andθ )  Children Adults Elderly 
β  = 1.0, θ  = 1.0  81.35 74.58  76.73 
β  = 1.0, θ  = 0.9  69.56 62.17  65.65 
β  = 1.0, θ  = 0.8  54.01 46.71  50.31 
β  = 1.0, θ  = 0.7  35.10 29.72  34.83 
β  = 1.0, θ  = 0.6  20.67 17.70  20.74 
β  = 0.75, θ  = 1.0  74.57 68.77  71.24 
β  = 0.75, θ  = 0.9  60.91 55.12  58.50 
β  = 0.75, θ  = 0.8  44.43 39.40  43.29 
β  = 0.75, θ  = 0.7  27.88 24.52  28.80 
β  = 0.75, θ  = 0.6  16.32 14.61  17.26 
β  = 0.50, θ  = 1.0  64.20 60.77  64.30 
β  = 0.50, θ  = 0.9  49.39 46.72  50.49 
β  = 0.50, θ  = 0.8  33.25 31.12  35.50 
β  = 0.50, θ  = 0.7  20.75 19.44  22.96 
β  = 0.50, θ  = 0.6  12.39 11.74  13.60 
Population shares   43.87  50.58  5.55 
 
Table 4: Household headcount ratio i.e. percentage of households who are poor 
distinguishing different types of households 
  
 Types  of  household 
  All  With  Without  With Child  With child 
Combinations of (β  andθ )    elderly   elderly  & no elderly  & elderly 
β  = 1.0, θ  = 1.0  68.48 76.04 62.76 68.29 79.20 
β  = 1.0, θ  = 0.9  58.00 65.11 52.64 57.10 67.68 
β  = 1.0, θ  = 0.8  44.68 49.95 40.71 43.39 51.94 
β  = 1.0, θ  = 0.7  30.71 34.19 28.10 30.12 35.27 
β  = 1.0, θ  = 0.6  19.64 20.75 18.81 19.89 21.04 
β  = 0.75, θ  = 1.0  61.93 70.53 55.47 60.14 73.30 
β  = 0.75, θ  = 0.9  50.29 57.70 44.71 48.26 59.76 
β  = 0.75, θ  = 0.8  37.34 42.50 33.46 35.91 43.97 
β  = 0.75, θ  = 0.7  24.92 28.16 22.49 23.88 28.83 
β  = 0.75, θ  = 0.6  16.22 17.52 15.24 15.92 17.59 2007/07 
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β  = 0.50, θ  = 1.0  53.04 63.18 45.41 48.95 65.44 
β  = 0.50, θ  = 0.9  41.21 49.51 34.96 37.42 51.00 
β  = 0.50, θ  = 0.8  28.98 34.52 24.89 26.37 35.33 
β  = 0.50, θ  = 0.7  19.46 22.30 17.32 18.13 22.54 
β  = 0.50, θ  = 0.6  13.08 13.73 12.59 12.70 13.53 
Population  shares  1.0  0.43 0.57 0.60 0.40 
 
It is worth emphasizing that there are no huge differences in the size of poverty reductions across 
age groups and household types when child cost varies. This is due to the fact that the average 
ratio of children within households is almost identical for all age groups (see tables A1 and A2). 
As a consequence of that, changes in child cost are likely to have little impact on relative 
poverty. Then, poverty ranking between age groups or between household types remains quite 
identical when child cost varies, holding economies of scales constant. Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that in poverty studies carried out in Senegal, child cost is usually valued to 0.5 of an 
adult and θ  = 1 (no economies of scales). Thus in what follows, we use these values of the 
parameters β  andθ  to analyze poverty among the elderly in Senegal. 
 
Poverty among elderly 
Table 5 gives the poverty measures in 1995 and 2000 for the different age groups and for the 
whole population using the combination (β ,θ ) = (0.5, 1). What is striking from this table is 
that, by all measures, poverty profiles are quite identical across age groups. Disparities in 
poverty measures are only noticed between areas, with a higher concentration of poverty in rural 
areas compared to urban areas. This leads to a conclusion that being poor is apparently not 
related to the age of the individuals; thus, growing old in Senegal does not imply more poverty. 
This is however a misconception of the reality. The main reason is that, due to the form of living 
arrangements prevailing in Senegal, poor people are likely to live together. It is therefore 
obvious that individual poverty profiles would tend to be similar. 
 
In contrast, when comparing poverty profiles across households, we observe that poverty is more 
pervasive amongst households comprising elderly. By all measures, these households have the 
highest levels of poverty. For example, it can be seen from table 4, with (β ,θ ) = (0.5, 1) , that 
the poverty incidence for households comprising elderly is 10 points higher than that of the 
average population (63.18 percent opposed to 53.04), while the poverty incidence for households 
without old person is solely 45.41 percent. And households are poorer when they comprise 
elderly and children. Almost two-third of households of this type are poor. This is likely not due 
to the fact that households with children and elderly have less working age adults or a higher 
proportion of children (see table A2). In contrast, that may be related to the presence of a highest 
number of older people. Comparison from household headship perspective also reveals that 
elderly-headed households are more affected by poverty. More than 60 percent of these 
households are poor, while poverty incidence accounts for only 50 percent for households not 
headed by an old person.  
  2007/07 
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Another noteworthy result is that poor households amongst those comprising old people are 
poorer than the poor among households without elderly. The average distance separating 
households with elderly from the poverty line, as a proportion of that line, is higher than that of 
households without elderly. Thus, the average income shortfall as a proportion of the poverty 
line is only 0.14 for poor household not comprising elderly, while it amounts to above one-fifth 
for those with old person (0.21). The poverty gap is also relatively more important for poor 
households comprising elderly and children (0.22) and those headed by an old person (0.20). 
Table 5 reports changes in aggregate poverty measures over the period 1995-2001. Results 
indicate that the poverty measures do not vary uniformly across the different types of 
households. By all measures and in terms of poverty reduction, households without elderly 
outperform those comprising older people. For example, the size of reduction in the headcount 
index for this type of households represents almost 11 percentage points. That is largely above 
the national average and corresponds to twofold the one of households comprising elderly. What 
could explain these disparities? Going back to living arrangements within households, we see 
that the proportion of adults and the proportion of children are almost similar in both types of 
households. It seems then that the differences in the incidence and the depth of poverty amongst 
households stem from the presence or not of elderly. This suggests a strong association between 
the presence of an old person within a household and the probability for this household to fall in 
poverty. This can be compared with results from (Subbarao and Kakwani, 2005). They find that 
households with no elderly have a much lower incidence of poverty than households with elderly 
and children in 10 out of 15 African countries. Moreover, households headed by the elderly, 
compared to those not headed by the elderly, show higher level of headcount index in 12 out of 
15 countries, with substantial differences (more than 10 percentage points) in 7 countries 
(Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia). They also find 
that the similar differences by household types are applied when comparing poverty gap or 
poverty severity ratios. 
 
Furthermore, when decomposing
4 the contributions of different household types to reductions in 
aggregate poverty measures, we also find that households not comprising old people have the 
largest influence on aggregate poverty reduction over the period 1995-2001. Almost 70% of the 
reductions in the national headcount and poverty gap indexes are due to poverty reduction 
among households without elderly, while it accounts for 66% of the reduction in the poverty 
severity index. In contrast, only 26% of the reductions in aggregate headcount index are related 
to changes in poverty within households comprising elderly. For reductions in aggregate poverty 
gap and poverty severity, it accounts for 27 and 30% respectively. All this suggests that 
households with elderly have benefited much less than the other household types with the high  
                                                 
4 Using the additive property of FGT poverty measures, we replicate the decomposition formula proposed 
in (Huppi and Ravallion, 1991) to explain change in poverty over time in terms of within-group poverty 
change (controlling for their base period population shares), population shift effects and interaction 
effects. Let  kt P  denotes the FGT poverty measure or population-group k with population share  k f  at time 
t. Then, change in poverty measure P can be written as follows: 
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growth rates enjoyed by the Senegalese economy during this period. The implication is that the 
effectiveness with which growth translates into poverty reduction in Senegal depends crucially 
on the presence or not of an old person within households. Households comprising old people 
are thus likely to be handicapped in seizing growth-driven opportunities to escape poverty. 
 
Table 5: Poverty variation over 1995-2000 (points of percentage) 
 
 Types  of  household 
  All  With  Without  With Child  With child 
    elderly   elderly  & no elderly  & elderly 
Headcount  -8.37  -4.84 -10.60 -9.16  -4.27 
Poverty  gap  -3.77 -2.27 -4.73 -4.43 -2.22 
Poverty  severity  -1.87 -1.26 -2.26 -2.18 -1.24 
Population  shares  1.0  0.43 0.57 0.60 0.40 
Source: Our own calculations using ESAM I and ESAM II 
 
 
Table 6: Contribution to poverty variation by households types (1995-2000) 
 
 Percentage  change 
Households types  Headcount  Poverty gap   Poverty severity 
All households  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Total intra-group effects  95.75  96.23  96.48 
Households without elderly  69.73  69.15  66.33 
Households with elderly  26.01  27.07  30.15 
Population-shifts effects  2.87  2.46  2.45 
Interaction effects  1.38  1.31  1.07 
Note: Population shares in period 1 correspond to 55.06% for households not comprising old people and  
          44.94% for those with elderly. 
 
3. Taxonomy of basic pensions 
There are two options for structuring a basic pension program. These are: i) a universal flat 
pension scheme; and ii) a flat pension scheme targeting the elderly poor. A universal flat pension 
scheme, often referred as a “demogrant”, covers the entire aged population. It provides the same 
pension benefit to all elderly people irrespective of their earnings history, assets or income. It 
has three important advantages which makes it very appealing, particularly for developing 
countries with limited administrative capacities and incomplete record-keeping system. First, the 
scheme is very simple and easy to administer. There is no need to determine the income, wealth 
or employment status of the beneficiaries. It involves consequently very low transaction costs. 
Second, it does not discourage the elderly from working or penalize those who save for their old 
age. Moreover, paying benefits regardless of needs will not be seen as charity and does not 
therefore create social stigma. The third advantage, which stems from the two previous ones, is 
that a universal pension scheme has less take-up problem. To meet objectives of poverty 
reduction in old age, it is fundamental that the entitled people are not discouraged to claim their 
benefits. And this will not be the case if benefits’ delivery rules are very complex or benefits are 
subject to stigma. However, it is worth stressing that, because it is universal, such a basic 
pension scheme tends to be very costly, with consequent tax rates. The implication is that a 
universal basic pension program is usually regarded as a luxury that will be difficult to afford. 
To address this cost issue, some analysts suggest retrieving part of the cost by subjecting benefits   2007/07 
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to incomes taxes with higher tax rates above a given threshold. But this could be difficult to 
implement in developing countries with limited administrative capacities to collect taxes. 
Willmore challenges this concern about the cost and argues that a universal basic pension is 
unsustainable only if pensions are extremely generous or if per capita output falls sharply 
(Willmore, 2007). Using algebraic calculations, he demonstrates that what is crucial is the per 
capita output. He estimates thus that a universal basic pension does not imply onerous taxes if 
per capita output is growing or constant. 
 
Unlike universal basic pension scheme, a targeted one allows to control costs by reducing 
eligibility to benefits. In effect, under a targeted pension scheme, benefits are paid only to old 
people whose income or assets lie below a specific level. Thus, the aggregate costs associated 
with pension provision can be limited. Moreover, by focusing only on a specific target, such a 
scheme also allows to offer more generous pension benefits. Note that when structuring a 
targeted pension scheme, there are three distinctions to be made between the following: 
1.  Income-testing: pension is paid to elderly people with a cash-income below a certain 
threshold value; 
2.  Mean-testing: pension goes to elderly people with a level of cash-income and assets 
below a certain threshold value; 
3.  Proxy-means testing: pension is paid to elderly people who fit certain indication 
values correlated with poverty which are easier to observe than income or assets 
(such as household size, geographical location, number of children, etc.). 
Despite the advantages highlighted above, a targeted pension program does, however, carry 
some important limits. First, administrating such a program is not simple. As a consequence of 
that, administrative costs would likely increase, as would opportunities for corrupt behavior of 
public officials. Second, a tested pension program carries a moral hazard problem characterized 
as "prodigality effect". Rational prodigality occurs when people don’t save for their retirement 
relying on public support hat they expect to receive later when they are old. In the presence of 
tested pension program, people who behave as "rational prodigals" are then likely to reach 
retirement without saving or not saving enough in order to be entitled to basic pension benefits. 
A tested pension program reduces thus incentive to save for retirement. It also reduces incentives 
for people to work when old and near the threshold of entitlement. Moreover, due to the 
complexity of the rules of entitlement and delivery and also due to social prejudice usually 
associated to tested benefits, targeted pension schemes often face a non-take-up problem. The 
implication is that the proportion of eligible people claiming benefits could be lower than what is 
potential expected. And, as a result of that, the objectives of poverty alleviation could not be 
met. 
 
Basic pension benefits (universal or tested) are usually financed through general income or 
consumption taxes. The amount of taxes needed to finance benefits depends on the number of 
beneficiaries, determined by the eligibility conditions and on the level of generosity of the 
pension. The budget constraint requires that tax revenue equals pension expenditures or, 
equivalently, that tax revenue per capita equals expenditure per capita: 
 
  y b e y * * * = τ  (4.7)   2007/07 
14 
 
where τ  is the tax rate; y is per capita GDP; e is the proportion of the population eligible for a 
basic pension; and b is the ratio of the pension benefit to per capita GDP. 
 
Solving for τ  gives: 
  b e* = τ  (4.8)   
The tax rate (as proportion of GDP) corresponds then to the proportion of the population eligible 
for pension benefits times the ratio of the pension to per capita GDP.  
 
Thus, the more generous the pension and the larger the proportion of eligible people, the higher 
the fiscal cost of pension benefits will be. A large the proportion of eligible people is dependent 
on a low eligibility age and a high income threshold high. Therefore, basic pension plans could 
be made appropriately affordable by rising the age of qualification and the income threshold 
and/or setting pension benefits at very moderate levels. 
 
4. Simulation results 
Our simulation strategy consists as follows. We first consider three alternative forms of basic 
pension schemes: 
1.  a universal pension benefit is given to all elderly people; 
2.  a poverty-tested pension benefit is given to all poor elderly; 
3.  a poverty-tested pension benefit is given to the poorest amongst poor elderly;
5 
4.  a poverty-tested pension benefit is given to the richest amongst poor elderly. 
In a second step, we measure under each form of basic pension scheme the impact of pension 
transfers following different levels of generosity. Note that all pension transfers are required to 
be non-negative. Let  i p  be the pension benefit paid to a household i, we consider two options: 
1.  the level of pension benefit corresponds to the poverty line taking account of the 
living area:  z pi =  
2.  the level of pension benefit corresponds to the average income shortfall of poor 
households:  q i y z p − = ; 
with  z y y y i
q
i
i q q < = ∑
=




                                                 
5 Let ( ) q y y y ,........, , 2 1  be the income distribution among the poor. Without loss of generality, we index 
them: q y y y < < < ........ 2 1 .  Assume  Q y  the average income shortfall of the poor. We can partition 
the group of the poor distinguishing the poorest of the poor as those whose income is lower than  Q y  
while the richest ones are those whose income is higher than Q y .  2007/07 
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Note that we use these levels of pension benefits just for an illustrative perspective. We are not 
advocating that this should be the optimal level of pension. We are simply trying to provide cost 
estimations of what we believe to be likely upper-bound benefits. 
 
4.1.  Impact on poverty  
To examine the impact on poverty of basic pension benefits, a series of results are reported in 
tables 7 through 9. These results concern the impact on poverty among households. In effect, our 
estimates assume that pension benefits are shared between beneficiaries and their co-residents. 
Such an assumption is realistic since evidence has showed that old people in Senegal often live 
in large and multigenerational households. 
 
At first glance, one fact is worth stressing. There is no difference in terms of poverty-reduction 
strategy between a universal pension scheme covering all elderly people whatever their 
resources and a basic pension plan covering only the poor amongst the elderly. Both plans yield 
the same level of poverty reduction. This means then that, in terms of poverty-efficient 
allocation, the strategy of universal coverage is inferior to the option of covering only the poor 
amongst the elderly. Under a universal basic pension program, resources are wasted on persons 
with income above the poverty line.  
 
Going back to tables 7-9, we also note that the poverty reduction impacts of pension benefits 
depend crucially on the level of generosity. Results of the simulations show impressive poverty 
reductions with a pension benefit’s level which is equal to the poverty line. For households 
comprising elderly, a pension benefit of such level induces a diminution of the headcount index 
of 23 percent and a reduction of the poverty gap and the poverty severity indexes of 39 and 49 
percent respectively. At a national level, this is translated into significant reductions in all 
poverty measures. Thus, the national headcount index is reduced by 12 percent and the aggregate 
poverty gap and poverty severity indexes by 21 and 27 percent respectively. The results are 
however less important when the pension benefit’s level corresponds to the average income 
shortfall. Looking at the headcount index, we note a modest poverty reduction impact. The 
headcount is reduced by only 7 percent for households comprising older people and 4 percent at 
national level. This modest impact is likely due to the fact that a pension benefit’s level of this 
size is not large enough to lift out of poverty the ones who are lower in the poverty scale. 
Simulation results in table 7 indicate that, for the poorest among the poor (those in the lower tail 
of the income distribution among the poor – see footnote page 14), the impact on the headcount 
index is zero. In contrast, for the richest amongst the poor elderly, the impact is 7 percent. This 
means that the headcount poverty index is more sensitive to a monetary unit given to the least 
poor than to someone lower in the poverty scale. Then, if resources are not sufficient enough and 
one aims to have as few elderly as possible remaining in poverty (lowering the headcount index), 
the best resource allocation strategy is to target only the poor elderly who are close to the 
poverty line. 
 
The results are considerably different if one were to consider the impacts on the poverty gap and 
the poverty severity ratios. Evidence from tables 8 and 9 indicates that paying pension benefits 
exclusively to the poorest amongst the poor elderly result in greater reductions in the poverty 
gap and the poverty severity than if benefits were paid only to the richest of the poor. What this 
implies is that if the objective is to reduce the inequality amongst the poor and attenuate the  2007/07 
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severity of poverty, the best strategy is to focus on the poor elderly lower in the poverty scale 
(Bourguignon and Fields, 1990). 
 
Table 7: Percentage of reduction in headcount index 
 
 Types  of  household 
  All  With  Without  With Child  With child 
Coverage    Elderly   elderly  & no elderly  & elderly 
  Benefit’s level:  z pi =  (240 464 FCFA or 366.6 Euros) 
Universal/All poor  12  23  0  22  55 
Poorest  poor  2 4 0 4  22 
Richest poor  10  19  0  18  32 
  Benefit’s level:  q i y z p − =  (68925 FCFA or 105 Euros) 
Universal/All  poor  4 7 0 7  18 
Poorest  poor  0 0 0 0 0 
Richest  poor  4 7 0 7  18 
Source: Our own calculations  
 
Table 8: Percentage of reduction in poverty gap 
 
 Types  of  household 
  All  With  Without  With Child  With child 
Coverage    Elderly   elderly  & no elderly  & elderly 
  Benefit’s level:  z pi =  (240 464 FCFA or 366.6 Euros) 
Universal/All poor  21  39  0  38  74 
Poorest poor  25  28  0  27  47 
Richest  poor  6 11 0 11  27 
  Benefit’s level:  q i y z p − =  (68925 FCFA or 105 Euros) 
Universal/All  poor  8 15 0 15  37 
Poorest  poor  6 11 0 10  23 
Richest  poor  2 5 0 4  14 
Source: Our own calculations  
 
 
Table 9: Percentage of reduction in poverty severity 
 
 Types  of  household 
  All  With  Without  With Child  With child 
Coverage    Elderly   elderly  & no elderly  & elderly 
  Benefit’s level:  z pi =  (240 464 FCFA or 366.6 Euros) 
Universal/All poor  27  49  0  48  83 
Poorest poor  22  41  0  41  62 
Richest  poor  4 8 0 7  22 
  Benefit’s level:  q i y z p − =  (68925 FCFA or 105 Euros) 
Universal/All poor  11  21  0  20  49 
Poorest poor  10  18  0  17  37 
Richest  poor  2 3 0 3  11 
Source: Our own calculations   2007/07 
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In summary, simulations indicate that basic pension benefits have significant poverty reduction 
impacts. These poverty drops are all the more so since benefits are very generous and the system 
is universal or covers all the poor elderly. If, however, pension benefits are not too high and do 
not cover all poor elderly, the poverty reduction impact will vary depending on the group 
targeted and on poverty measures. Furthermore, note that in these simulations, we did not look at 
the consequences of basic pension benefits for the elderly per se. We should however have in 
mind that these benefits will presumably affect their position within the household. In effect, 
providing basic pension benefits also leads to improvement on the capacities and the capabilities 
of the beneficiaries. And, it is evidenced that within extended households, the ability to 
contribute determines and shapes in many ways the possibilities for everyone to weigh on the 
decision process. 
 
4.2.  Fiscal cost 
Table 10 summarizes the GDP cost of the different scenarios of basic pensions presented above. 
The highest GDP cost corresponds to the universal basic pension with benefits paid amounting 
to the value of the poverty line corresponding to 240464 FCFA or 366.6 Euros. In terms of 
generosity, this is equivalent to 77 percent of the GDP per capita.  
 
The aggregate corresponding cost represents almost 4 percent of the GDP. However, this cost is 
likely too high regarding the poverty reduction impacts that are achieved. It is however possible 
to realize the same results with a much lower GDP cost by limiting coverage to only the poor 
elderly.  In this case, the aggregate cost amounts to about 2.5 percent of the GDP. 
 
When pension benefits are less generous, the resources required (as percentage of GDP) to cover 
all poor elderly are much lower. Results from simulations indicate that providing a pension 
benefit of the amount of the poverty gap (22 percent of GDP per capita thus 68925 FCFA or 105 
Euros) to all poor elderly requires only 0.8 percent of GDP. The reduction in the aggregate 
headcount index associated with this scenario corresponds to 4 percent while the poverty gap 
and the poverty at the national level are reduced by 8 and 11 percent respectively (see column 
“All” in tables 7, 8 and 9). This is very significant and quite conforms with results from 
Subbarao and Kakwani (2005) who simulated the poverty reduction impacts of targeting 0.5 
percent of GDP to all poor elderly in 15 African countries. 
 
Table 10: GDP cost of each basic pension scheme (percentage) 
 
  Level of pension benefit (in FCFA) 
  z pi =   q i y z p − =  
Coverage strategy  240464.00  (366.6 Euros)  68925.19 (105.1 Euros) 
Universal 3.94  1.30 
Target all poor  2.45  0.83 
Target the poorest of the poor  1.33  0.50 
Target the richest of the poor  1.25  0.33 
 
Clearly, it is noteworthy that this fiscal cost is not very large and even is smaller than what is 
observed in some countries. In Namibia, the old age cash transfer program requires almost 2 
percent of GDP. In South Africa, the cost of the social pension program is estimated at between 
2 and 3 percent of GDP. In Brazil, the cost of the rural pension program is around 1 percent of  2007/07 
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GDP (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000). And in Mauritius, the cost of the old age transfer program 
represents 2 percent of GDP (Willmore, 2007). However, it is noteworthy that these estimated 
costs do not take account the administrative cost for implementing and managing the program 
and the costs of possible corruption and leakage to the non-poor. Each of these can considerably 
change the estimated costs of the pension benefits. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The paper has provided an analysis of basic pension’s effects on poverty measures. Simulations 
indicate dramatic poverty reductions amongst households with elderly in the different scenarios 
considered. And these impressive poverty reductions also translate into large decreases in 
aggregate poverty measures. This is due to the strong correlation between poverty and 
households with old people. In the Senegalese context, a basic pension program for old-age thus 
has a strong poverty relief effect. The paper also focuses on the issue of the fiscal costs of basic 
pensions. It seems that these are fiscally affordable as far as pension levels are reasonable. This 
suggests thus that a basic pension program could be financially sustainable in Senegal.  
 
What is crucial then is the matter of implementation. There are specific administrative 
challenges involved here. These include determining the appropriate choice of basic pension 
mechanisms regarding the two main strategies: universal or targeted scheme. In this paper, it 
seems that the best option in terms of fiscal cost and poverty reduction impact is that targeting 
the poor. But, the effectiveness with which this option translates into fiscal sustainability and 
poverty reductions depends crucially on the possibility to identify cost-effectively the poor 
households with elderly.  
 
This raises the issue of policy-design and administrative capacity. The key challenge is to 
identify appropriately entitled people and deliver benefits effectively and in due time. In this 
paper, we only investigate the poverty reduction impacts of basic pensions. But, it is also 
noteworthy that these pensions can play an important role encouraging economic activities and 
human capital accumulation. The available evidence from South Africa for example shows that 
pensions have improved children’s outcomes and have also favored a rise of female labor force 
participation (Duflo, 2003; Posel, Fairburn, and Lund, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, basic pension programs are also beneficial in these countries since they could 
contribute to ease some deadlocks in the labor market. In effect, in most of the African countries, 
unlike in the developed ones, unions wish to push up the age of retirement while the employers 
are against that. Unions’ claims mainly rely on the idea that retirement signifies fall into 
destitution since retirees’ incomes are very low. In contrast, employers’ opposition is grounded 
on some imperative of competitiveness. They argue that even if life expectancy is growing this is 
not paired with productivity maintenance. Then, postponing retirement and keeping old workers 
would jeopardize the competitiveness. Such a problem is intrinsically linked to the structures of 
the labor market and of pension systems in these countries. In most cases, at retirement age, 
workers have not contributed enough to be entitled to a pension that would prevent them from 
falling into poverty. The main reason is that the qualified worker usually enters in the labor 
market at very late age (short contribution length), while the non-qualified workers is very low 
paid (they cannot contribute enough). The introduction of a poverty-tested basic pension would 




  1.   Aboderin, I. (2004). "Decline in material family support for older people in urban Ghana, 
Africa: understanding processes and causes of change", J. Gerontol. B Psychol. Sci. Soc. 
Sci., 59 (3): S128-S137.  
  2.   Barrientos, A. (2003). "What is the impact of non-contributory pensions on poverty? 
Estimates from Brazil and South Africa", CPRC Working Paper IDPM/Chronic Poverty 
Research Centre (CPRC), Manchester. 
  3.   Barrientos, A., M. Gorman, and A. Heslop (2003). "Old age poverty in developing 
countries contributions and dependence in later life", World Development, 31 (3): 555-
570.  
  4.   Bertrand, M., S. Mullainathan, and D. Miller (2003). "Public policy and extended families: 
evidence from pensions in South Africa", World Bank Economic Review, 17 (1): 27-50.  
  5.   Bourguignon, F., M. Cicowiez, J. J. Dethier, L. Gasparini, and P. Pestieau (2004). "What 
Impact Would a Minimum Pension Have on Old Age Poverty? Evidence from Latin 
America", Paper presented at the Conference on Keeping the Promise of Old-age Security, 
June 23-24, Bogotá - Colombia. 
  6.  Bourguignon, F. and G. S. Fields (1990). "Poverty measures and anti-poverty policy", 
Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 56 (3-4): 409-427.  
  7.   Buchmann, C. (2000). "Family Structure, Parental Perceptions, and Child Labor in Kenya: 
What Factors Determine Who is Enrolled in School?", Social Forces, 78 (4): 1349-1378.  
  8.   Case, A. and A. Deaton (1998). "Large Cash Transfers to the Elderly in South Africa", The 
Economic Journal, 108 (450): 1330-1361.  
  9.   de Carvalho Filho, I. E. (2001). Household income as a determinant of child labor and 
school enrollment in Brazil: Evidence from a social security reform, Boston University - 
Department of Economics. 
 10.   Deaton, A. and C. H. Paxson (1995). "Measuring poverty among the elderly", NBER 
Working Paper Series No 5296, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
 11.   Deaton, A. and C. H. Paxson (1997). "Poverty among children and the elderly in 
developing countries", Discussion Paper No 179, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs, Research Program in Development Studies, Princeton University. 
 12.  DPS (2004). La pauvreté au Sénégal: De la dévaluation de 1994 à 2001-2002, Direction 
de la Prévision et de la Statistique - Ministry of Economics and Finance, Version 
preliminaire, Dakar - Sénégal. 
 13.   Duflo, E. (2003). "Grandmothers and granddaughters: old age pension and intra-household 
allocation in South Africa", The World Bank Economic Review, 17 (1): 1-25.  
 14.   Foster, J., J. Greer, and E. Thorbecke (1984). "A Class of Decomposable Poverty 




 15.   Huppi, M. and M. Ravallion (1991). "Sectoral structure of poverty during an adjustment 
period: evidence for Indonesia in the mid-1980s", Policy, Research, and External Affairs 
Working Papers No WPS 529, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC. 
  16.   Lachaud, J.-P. (2000). "Echelles d'équivalence et différentiel spatial de pauvreté et 
d'inégalité au Burkina Faso", Documents de travail  No 46, Centre d'Economie du 
Développement de l'Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, Bordeaux. 
 17.   Lloyd-Sherlock, P. (2000). "Old age and poverty in developing countries: new policy 
challenges", World Development, 28 (12): 2157-2168.  
 18.   Meillassoux, C. (1992). Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux, Paris: L'Harmattan. 
 19.   Posel, D., J. A. Fairburn, and F. Lund (2006). "Labour migration and households: A 
reconsideration of the effects of the social pension on labour supply in South Africa", 
Economic Modelling, 23 (5): 836-853.  
 20.   Subbarao, K. and N. Kakwani (2005). "Aging and poverty in Africa and the role of social 
pensions", Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No 521, The World Bank, 1818 H 
Street NW, Washington DC. 
 21.   Willmore, L. (2007). "Universal pensions for developing countries", World Development, 
35 (1): 24-51.  
 22.   World Bank (1994). Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote 
Growth, Washington DC: Oxford University Press. 
 23.   Zimmer, Z. and J. Dayton (2003). "The living arrangements of older adults in sub-Saharan 
Africa in a time of HIV/AIDS", Population Council Working Papers  No 169, The 
Population Council - Policy Research Division, New York. 
 
 





Table A1: Individuals’ Living arrangements 
 Children  Adults  Elderly 
Average      
Number  of  children  6.56 5.21 4.87 
Number  of  adults  6.01 6.75 5.58 
Number  of  elderly  0.62 0.61 1.49 
Household size  13.18  12.57  11.94 
Proportion  of  children  0.50 0.39 0.38 
Note: On average a child co-resides with 5.56 other children, 6.01 adults and 0.62 old people. He lives in a  
          household comprising 13.18 members on average and in which the average ratio of children is 0.50.  
 
 
Table A2: Living arrangements by household types 
 Types  of  household 
  All  With  Without  With Child  With child 
    elderly   elderly  & no elderly  & elderly 
Average        
Number  of  children  4.28  4.77 3.91 4.68 5.10 
Number  of  adults 4.94  5.45 4.55 5.15 5.63 
Number  of  elderly  0.54  1.26 0.00 0.55 1.26 
Household size  9.76  11.48  8.47  10.39  11.99 
Proportion  of  children  0.41  0.38 0.42 0.44 0.41 
Note: On average a household with elderly is comprised of 4.77 children, 5.45 adults and 1.26 old people. 
 